RankSign is a code-based signature scheme proposed to the NIST competition for postquantum cryptography [AGH + 17]. It is based on the rank metric and enjoys remarkably small key sizes, about 10KBytes for an intended level of security of 128 bits. It is also one of the fundamental blocks used in the rank metric identity based encryption scheme [GHPT17] . Unfortunately we will show that all the parameters proposed for this scheme in [AGH + 17] can be broken by an algebraic attack that exploits the fact that the augmented LRPC codes used in this scheme have very low weight codewords.
Introduction
It is a long standing open problem to build an efficient and secure signature scheme based on the hardness of decoding a linear code which could compete in all respects with DSA or RSA. Such schemes could indeed give a quantum resistant signature for replacing in practice the aforementioned signature schemes that are well known to be broken by quantum computers. A first partial answer to this question was given in [CFS01] . It consisted in adapting the Niederreiter scheme [Nie86] for this purpose. This requires a linear code for which there exists an efficient decoding algorithm for a non-negligible set of inputs. This means that if H is an r × n parity-check matrix of the code, there exists for a non-negligible set of elements s in {0, 1} r an efficient way to find a word e in {0, 1} n of smallest Hamming weight such that He ⊺ = s ⊺ .
The authors of [CFS01] noticed that very high rate Goppa codes are able to fulfill this task, and their scheme can indeed be considered as the first step towards a solution of the aforementioned problem. However, the poor scaling of the key size when security has to be increased prevents this scheme to be a completely satisfying answer to this issue.
There has been some exciting progress in this area for another metric, namely the rank metric [GRSZ14] . A code-based signature scheme whose security relies on decoding codes with respect to the rank metric has been proposed there. It is called RankSign. Strictly speaking, the rank metric consists in viewing an element in F N q (when N is a product N = m × n) as an m × n matrix over F q and the rank distance between two elements x and y is defined as the rank of the matrix x − y. This depends of course on how N is viewed as a product of two elements. Decoding in this metric is known to be an NP hard problem [BFS99, Cou01] . In the particular case of [GRSZ14] , the codes which are considered are not F q -linear but, as is customary in the setting of rank metric based cryptography, F q m -linear. This allows to reduce the key size by a factor of m when compared to the F q -linear setting (for more details see the paragraph at the end of Section 2).
Decoding such codes for the rank metric is not known to be NP-hard anymore. There is however a randomized reduction of this problem to decode an F q -linear code for the Hamming metric [GZ16] when the degree m of the extension field is sufficiently big. This situation is in some sense reminiscent to the current thread in cryptography based on codes or on lattices where structured codes (for instance quasi-cyclic codes) or structured lattices (corresponding to an additional ring structure) are taken. In the case at hand, there is however a randomized reduction to an NP complete problem. Furthermore, RankSign comes with a security proof showing that there is no leakage coming from signing many times and enjoys remarkably small key sizes: it is about 10KBytes for 128 bits of security for the parameters proposed in the NIST submission[AGH + 17]. It also proved to be a fundamental building block in the identity based encryption scheme based on the rank metric suggested in [GHPT17] .
Unfortunately we will show here that all the parameters proposed in [GRSZ14, AGH + 17] can be broken by a suitable algebraic attack. The problem is actually deeper than that, because we will show in the full-version of this paper that the attack is actually polynomial in nature and can not really be thwarted by changing the parameters. The attack builds upon the following observations
• The RankSign scheme is based on augmented LRPC codes;
• To have an efficient signature scheme, the parameters of the augmented LRPC codes have to be chosen very carefully;
• For the whole range of admissible parameters, it turns out rather unexpectedly that these augmented LRPC codes have very low-weight codewords. This can be proved by subspace product considerations;
• These low-weight codewords can be recovered by algebraic techniques and reveal enough of the secret trapdoor used in the scheme to be able to sign like a legitimate user.
2 Generalities on rank metric and F q m -linear codes
Definitions and notation
We provide here some notation and definitions that will be used throughout the paper.
Vector notation. Vectors will be written using bold lower-case letters, e.g. x. The ith component of x will be denoted by x i . Vectors are in row notation. Matrices will be written as bold capital letters, e.g. X, and the i-th column of a matrix X is denoted X i . The rank of a matrix X will be simply denoted by |X|.
Field notation. Let q be a power of a prime number. We will denote by F q the finite field of cardinality q.
Coding theory notation. A linear code C over a finite field F q of length n and dimension k is a subspace of the vector space F n q of dimension k. We say that it has parameters [n, k] or that it is an [n, k]-code. A generator matrix G for it is a k × n matrix over F q that is such that C = {uG : u ∈ F k q }. In other words, the rows of G form a basis of C . A parity-check matrix H for it is a full-rank (n − k) × n matrix over F q such that
In other words, C is the null space of H. Rank metric codes basically consist in viewing codewords as matrices. More precisely, when N is the product of two numbers m and n, N = mn we will equip the vector space F N q with the rank metric by viewing its elements as matrices over F m×n q , i.e.
Such a code is equipped in a natural way with the rank metric. There is a particular subclass of matrix codes that has the nice property to be specified much more compactly than a generic matrix code. It consists in taking a linear code over an extension field F q m of F q of length n. Such a code can be viewed as a matrix code consisting of matrices in F m×n q by expressing each coordinate c i of a codeword c = (c i ) 1≤i≤n in a fixed F q basis of F q m . When the F q m -linear code is of dimension k the dimension of the matrix code viewed as an
More precisely we bring in the following definition. This definition depends of course of the basis chosen for F q m . However changing the basis does not change the distance between codewords. The point of defining matrix codes in this way is that they have a more compact description. It is readily seen that an [m×n, k.m] matrix code over F q can be specified from a systematic generator matrix (i.e. a matrix of the form 1 k.m P with 1 k.m being the identity matrix of size k.m) by k(n − k)m 2 log 2 q bits whereas an F q m -linear code uses only k(n − k) log 2 q m = k(n − k)m log 2 q bits. This is particularly interesting for cryptographic applications where this notion is directly related to the public key size. This is basically what explains why in general McEliece cryptosystems based on rank metric matrix codes have a smaller keysize than McEliece cryptosystems based on the Hamming metric. All of these proposals (see for instance [GPT91, GO01, Gab08, GMRZ13, GRSZ14, ABD + 17b, AMAB + 17]) are actually built from matrix codes over F q obtained from F q m -linear codes. In a sense, they can be viewed as structured matrix codes, much in the same way as quasi-cyclic linear codes can be viewed as structured versions of linear codes. In the latter case, the code is globally invariant by a linear isometric transform on the codewords corresponding to shifts of a certain length. In the F q m linear case the code is globally invariant by an isometric linear transformation that corresponds to multiplication in F q m .
Rank code-based cryptography
Rank-based cryptography relies on the hardness of decoding for the rank metric. This problem is the rank metric analogue of the well known decoding problem in the Hamming metric [BMvT78] . We give it here its syndrome formulation:
Definition 2 (Rank (Metric) Syndrome Decoding Problem). Let H be a full-rank (n − k) × n matrix over F q m with k ≤ n, s ∈ F n−k q m and w an integer. The problem is to find e ∈ F n q m such that |e| = w and He ⊺ = s ⊺ .
This problem has recently been proven hard in [GZ16] by a probabilistic reduction to the decoding problem in the Hamming metric which is known to be NP-complete [BMvT78] . This problem has typically a unique solution when w is below the Varshamov Gilbert distance w rVG (q, m, n, k) for the rank metric which is defined as Definition 3 (Varshamov Gilbert distance for the rank metric). The Varshamov Gilbert distance w rVG (q, m, n, k) for F q m linear codes of dimension k in the rank metric is defined as the smallest t for which
where B t is the size of the ball of radius t in the rank metric.
Remark 1. 2. B t = t i=0 S i where S i is the size of a sphere of radius i in the rank metric over F m×n q . This latter quantity is equal to
3. From this last asymptotic expression it is straightforward to check that (for more details see [Loi14] )
when either m or n tend to infinity.
The best algorithms for solving the decoding problem in the rank metric are exponential in n 2 as long as m = Θ(n), w = Θ(n) but stays below the Singleton bound which is defined by Definition 4 (Singleton distance in the rank metric). The Singleton distance w rS (q, m, n, k) for F q m linear codes of dimension k in the rank metric is defined as
The usual notion of the support of a vector is generally relevant to decoding in the Hamming metric and corresponds for a vector x = (x i ) 1≤i≤n to the set of positions i in {1, . . . , n} such that x i = 0. Various decoding algorithms for the Hamming metric [Pra62, LB88, Ste88, Dum91, FS09, BLP11, MMT11, BJMM12, MO15, DT17, BM17] use this notion in a rather fundamental way. The definition of the support of a vector has to be changed a little bit to be relevant to the rank metric. This notion was first put forward in [GRS13, GRS16] to obtain an analogue of the Prange decoder [Pra62] for the rank metric.
Definition 5 (Support). Let x = (x i ) 1≤i≤n be a vector of F n q m , its support is defined as:
This notion of support is relied to the rank metric as it is easily verified that for any x vector of F n q m we have:
3 The RankSign scheme
We recall in this section basic facts about RankSign. It is based on augmented LRPC codes. Roughly speaking it is a hash and sign signature scheme: the message m that has to be signed is hashed by a hash function H and the signature is equal to f −1 (H (m)) where f is a trapdoor one-way function. Here the input to f is the set of vectors of F n q m of some (rank) weight w and f is given by f (e) △ = He ⊺ where H is a fixed r × n parity-check matrix of the augmented LRPC code used for the scheme. When the underlying LRPC structure is known (roughly speaking, this is the trapdoor), there is a decoding algorithm based on the LRPC structure that computes for any (or for a good fraction) s ∈ F r q an e ∈ F n q of weight w such that He ⊺ = s ⊺ . This decoding algorithm is probabilistic and the parameters of the code have to be chosen in a very specific fashion in order to have a probability of success very close to 1 (see Fact 1 at the end of this section). An LRPC code is a code that admits a parity-check check matrix that is homogeneous and of small weight. A homogeneous matrix is defined as 
LRPC (Low Rank Parity Check) codes of weight d and augmented LRPC codes of type (d, t) are defined from such matrices as Definition 7 (LRPC and augmented LRPC code). An LRPC code over F q m of weight d is a code that admits a parity-check matrix H with entries in F q m that is homogeneous of weight d whereas an augmented LRPC code of type (d, t) over F q m is a code that admits a parity-check matrix H ′ = H|R P where H is a homogeneous matrix of rank d over F q m , R is a matrix with t columns that has its entries in F q m and P is a square and invertible matrix with entries in F q that has the same number of columns as H ′ .
Remark 2. Note that P ∈ F n×n q is an isometry for the rank metric, since for any x ∈ F n q m we have Supp(x) = Supp(xP) and therefore |x| = |xP|.
The public key and the secret key for RankSign are given by: public key: H pub which is a random (n − k) × n parity-check matrix of an augmented LRPC code of type (d, t). It is of the form
with H ′ = H|R P where Q is an invertible (n − k)× (n − k) matrix over F q m , H is a homogeneous matrix of rank d over F q m , R is a matrix with t columns that has its entries in F q m and P is a square and invertible matrix with entries in F q that has the same number of columns as H ′ .
From the knowledge of this last matrix a signature is computed by using a decoding algorithm devised for LRPC codes. Recall that LRPC codes can be viewed as analogues of LDPC codes for the rank metric. In particular, they enjoy an efficient decoding algorithm based on their low rank parity-check matrix. Roughly speaking, Algorithm 1 of [GMRZ13] decodes up to w errors when dw ≤ n − k in polynomial time (see [GMRZ13, Theorem 1]). It uses in a crucial way the notion of the linear span of a product of subspaces of F q m :
Definition 8. Let U and V be two subspaces of F q m , then
Roughly speaking, Algorithm 1 of [GMRZ13] works as follows when we have to recover an error e of weight w from the knowledge of its syndrome s with respect to a parity-check matrix
Supp(e) and W △ = Supp(s). U and W are known, whereas V is unknown to the decoder. By definition U is of dimension d and it is convenient to bring in a basis {f 1 , . . . , f d } for it.
It turns out that we typically have
It also turns out that we typically have
V is therefore computed by taking the intersection of all the f
3. Once we have the support of e (V = Supp(e)), the error e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) can be recovered by solving the linear equation He ⊺ = s ⊺ with the additional constraints e i ∈ Supp(e) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. There are in this case enough linear constraints to recover a unique e.
The last algorithm seems to apply when there is a unique solution to (1). It can also be used with a slight modification (by adding "erasures" [GRSZ14] ) for weights for which there are many solutions to it (this is typically the regime which is used for the RankSign scheme). It namely turns out, see [GRSZ14] , that this decoder can for a certain range of parameters be used for a large fraction of possible syndromes s ∈ F r q m to produce an error e of weight w that satisfies (1). It can even be required that Supp(e) contains a subspace T of some dimension t. Furthermore this procedure can also be generalized to a parity-check matrix of an augmented LRPC code. More precisely to summarize the discussion that can be found in [GRSZ14, AGH
4 Attack on RankSign
The problem with RankSign : low rank codewords in the augmented LRPC code
A natural way to attack RankSign is to find low weight codewords in the dual of the augmented LRPC code. Recall that the public parity-check matrix used in the scheme is a matrix H pub where H pub = QH ′ with H ′ = H|R P where H is a homogeneous matrix of rank d over F q m , R is a matrix with t columns that has its entries in F q m , P is a square and invertible matrix with entries in F q that has the same number of columns as H ′ and Q is a square and invertible matrix over F q m which has the same number of rows as H ′ . If we call C pub the "public code" with parity-chek matrix H pub , then the dual code C ⊥ pub that has for generator matrix H pub has codewords of weight ≤ d + t since rows of H ′ P belong to this code, and all of its rows have rank weight ≤ d+ t since the rows of H ′ have weight at most d+ t and P is an isometry for the rank metric. The authors have chosen the parameters of the RankSign scheme so that finding codewords of weight t + d in C ⊥ pub is above the security level of the scheme. However, it turns out that due to the peculiar parameters chosen in the RankSign scheme (see Fact 1), C pub has many very low weight codewords. This is the main problem in RankSign. Before we give a precise statement together with its proof, we will give a general result showing that LRPC codes may have under certain circumstances low weight codewords. Lemma 1. Let C be an LRPC code of length n and dimension k over F q m that is associated to a homogeneous matrix H that has all its entries in a subspace F of F q m . Furthermore we suppose there exists a subspace F ′ of F q m such that
Then there exist nonzero codewords in the LRPC code whose support is included in F ′ . They are therefore of rank weight at most dim F ′ . Furthermore this set of codewords, that
Proof. Denote the entry in row i and column j of H by H i,j . A codeword c of the LRPC code satisfies
Looking in addition for a codeword c that has all its entries in F ′ and expressing these n − k linear equations over F q m in a basis of F · F ′ (since n j=1 H i,j c j belongs by definition to F · F ′ ) and expressing each c j in a F q basis {f ′ 1 , .
Remark 3. This theorem proves the existence of low rank codewords in an LRPC-code under some conditions but it does not give any efficient way to find them.
By using this lemma, we will prove the following corollary that explains that the augmented LRPC codes that are used in the RankSign signature necessarily contain many rank weight 2 codewords. This is in a sense a consequence of Equation (4) on the parameters of RankSign.
Corollary 2. Let C pub be an [n + t, k + t] public code of RankSign over F q m which has been obtained from an [n, k] LRPC-code that is associated to a homogeneous matrix H that has all its entries in an F q subspace F of F q m . Consider a subspace F ′ of F of dimension 2 and let
be the public parity-check matrix for the RankSign public code C pub . Recall that H pub has been obtained as H pub = Q H|R P where:
• P is a non-singular matrix with entries in F q of size (n + t) × (n + t),
• H is a homogeneous (n − k) × n matrix of weight d with all its entries in F .
Choose a basis {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x d } of F such that {x 1 , x 2 } is a basis of F ′ . We observe now that
The cardinality of the set {x i x j : i ∈ 1, d , j ∈ 1, 2 } is actually 2d − 1 because x 1 x 2 = x 2 x 1 . This implies that dim(F · F ′ ) ≤ 2d − 1.
It leads to the following inequalities,
Let C LRPC be the LRPC code of weight d associated to the parity-check matrix H and let C ′ LRPC be an F q subspace of it that is defined by
By applying Lemma 1 we know that
Consider now C
LRPC }, where 0 t denotes the vector with t zeros. From (6) we deduce that
Moreover the entries of any element c ′ in C pub belong to F ′ because the entries of P are in F q . Let us now prove that C ′ pub is contained in C pub . To verify this, consider an element c ′ in C ′ pub . It can be written as c ′ = (c LRPC , 0 t )(P −1 ) ⊺ .
We observe now that
= 0 (c LRPC belongs to the code of parity-check matrix H)
This proves that C ′ pub ⊂ C pub which concludes the proof.
Weight 1 codewords in a projected code
Corollary 2 shows that there are many weight 2 codewords in C pub . We can even restrict our search further by noticing that without loss of generality we may assume that the space F in which the entries of the secret parity-check matrix H of the LRPC code are taken contains 1. Indeed, for any α in F × q m , αH is also a parity-check matrix of the LRPC code and has its entries in αF . By choosing α such that αF contains 1 we get our claim.
Consider now a supplementary space V of 1 Fq = F q with respect to F q m , that is an F q -space of dimension m − 1 such that
The previous discussion implies that there is a matrix-code in F 
It is clear that
Fact 2. C proj pub contains codewords of rank weight 1.
These are just the codewords c ′ which are of the form Mat proj (c) where c ∈ C ′ pub with C ′ pub being defined from a subspace F ′ of F that contains 1 (we can make this assumption since we can assume that F contains 1). C proj pub has the structure of an F q -subspace of
. It is typically of dimension (k + t)m (i.e. the same as the F q dimension of C pub ). Moreover once we have these rank weight 1 codewords in C proj pub we can lift them to obtain rank weight ≤ 2 codewords in C pub because for any c ∈ C pub the first row of Mat(c) can be uniquely recovered from Mat proj (c) by performing linear combinations of the entries of Mat proj (c). We call this operation deducing c from Mat proj (c) lifting from C proj pub to C pub .
Outline of the attack
Finding codewords of rank 1 in C proj pub obviously reveals much of the secret LRPC structure. Lifting elements in C proj pub that are of rank 1 to C pub as explained at the end of Subsection 4.2 yields codewords of C pub that have typically rank weight 2. This can be used to reveal F ′ and actually the whole subspace F by finding enough rank 1 codewords in C proj pub . Once F is recovered a suitable form for a parity-check matrix of C pub can be found that allows signing like a legitimate user. For the case of the parameters of RankSign proposed in [GRSZ14, AGH + 17] for which we always have d = 2 we will proceed slightly differently here. Roughly speaking, our attack can be decomposed as follows 1. We find a particular element M in C proj pub of rank weight 1 by solving a certain bilinear system with Gröbner bases techniques.
2. We lift M ∈ C proj pub to c ∈ C pub and compute F ′ △ = Supp(c).
4. We use this subspace of C pub to find a suitable parity-check matrix for C pub which allows us to sign like a legitimate user.
Steps 2. and 3. are straightforward. We just give details for Steps 1. and 4. in what follows.
4.4 Finding rank 1 matrices in C proj pub by solving a bilinear system
The basic bilinear system. Finding rank 1 matrices in C proj pub can be formulated as an instance of the MinRank problem [BFS99, Cou01] . We could use standard techniques for solving this problem [KS99, FLdVP08, FDS10, Spa12] but we found that it is better here to use the algebraic modeling suggested in [AGH + 17]. It basically consists in setting up an algebraic system with unknowns x = (x 1 , . . . , x m−1 ) ∈ F m−1 q and y ∈ F n+t q where the unknown matrix M in C proj pub that should be of rank 1 has the form
Recall that C proj pub has the structure of an F q subspace of
By viewing the elements of C . This matrix gives (m−1)(n+t)−(k+t)m bilinear equations that have to be satisfied by the x i 's and the y j 's:
Restricting the number of solutions. We have solved the bilinear system (7) with standard Gröbner bases techniques that are implemented in Magma. To speed-up the resolution of the bilinear system with Gröbner bases techniques (especially the change of order that is performed after a first computation of a Gröbner basis for a suitable order to deduce a basis for the lexicographic order which is more suited for outputting a solution) it is helpful to use additional equations that restrict the solution space which is otherwise really huge in this case. The purpose of the following discussion is to show where these solutions come from and how to restrict them.
By bilinearity of System (7) we may fix x 1 = 1 (when there is a solution x such that x 1 = 0). Furthermore, the fact that C ′ pub is an F q vector space of dimension n/d induces that for a given x solution to (7) the set of corresponding y's also forms a vector space of dimension n/d. We may therefore rather safely assume that we can choose ∀i ∈ 1, n d − 1 , y i = 0 and y n/d = 1.
There is an additional degree of freedom on x coming from the fact that even if d = 2 there are several spaces αF for which 1 ∈ αF . To verify this, let us study in more detail the case when F is of dimension 2, say F = a, b Fq . 
The possible values for x will then be the projection of those z to the F q space β 1 , . . . , β m−1 Fq .
The possible values for z are then obtained from studying the possible values for c. There are two cases to consider:
• Case 1: c = µ a+bν for µ ∈ F × q and ν ∈ F q . In such a case
• Case 2:
Since the δ term vanishes after projecting x onto β 1 , . . . , β m−1 Fq we have essentially two degrees of freedom over F q for x. One has already been taken into account when setting x 1 = 1. We can add a second one x 2 = α where α is arbitrary in F q . We have actually chosen in our experiments that (x 2 − α)(x 2 − β) = 0 for some random α and β in F q . This has resulted in some gain in the computation of the solution space.
Numerical results
We give in Table 1 our numerical results to find a codeword of rank 2 in any public code of the RankSign scheme for parameters chosen according to [AGH + 17].
Finishing the attack
We present in this subsection the end of our attack which consists in being able to sign with only the knowledge of the public key. It holds for the parameters chosen for the NIST competition [AGH + 17] for which d = 2. Observe that (4) implies that we have k = n−k = n/2. We have at that point obtained the code C ′ pub that is dimension (over F q ) ≥ n/d = n/2 = k. This code is just F q -linear, but it will be convenient to extend this code by considering its F q m -linear extension, that we denote F q m ⊗ C ′ pub that is defined by the F q m -linear subspace of 
To simplify the discussion we make now the following assumption (which was corroborated by our experiments)
The rationale behind this assumption is that (i) the dimension of C ′ pub is very likely to be n/d which is equal to k and (ii) an F q basis of C ′ pub is very likely to be an F q m basis too.
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 1 the code F q m ⊗ C ′ pub ⊥ has length n+t, dimension n+t−k and is an LRPC-code that is associated to a homogeneous matrix that has all its entries in an F q subspace F of F q m of dimension 2 which contains 1. Furthermore, the sets
There is a generator matrix for F q m ⊗ C ′ pub that is formed by rows taken from C ′ pub . It is homogeneous of weight 2. Say that its entries generate a space F . This is also a parity-check matrix of the dual code. F q m ⊗ C ′ pub ⊥ is therefore an LRPC code of weight 2.
By applying now Lemma 1 to it with F ′ = F q , we have
which gives the result for the set D. We apply once again Lemma 1 but this time with F ′ = F . Say F = 1, x 1 Fq . This gives a lower bound on the dimension of D ′ which is
To end our attack we make now the following assumption that was again corroborated in our experiments. 
pub , an invertible matrix P of size n + t with entries in the small field F q and an invertible matrix S of size n + t − k with entries in F q m such that
where R is homogeneous of degree 2 and of size (n − k) × n.
Proof. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 there is a generator matrix of F q m ⊗ C ′ pub ⊥ and thus a parity-check matrix of F q m ⊗ C ′ pub which is homogeneous of degree 2 with the particularity that t rows of it are of rank 1. Let H ′ be such a matrix, thus by making a Gaussian elimination on its rows we have an invertible matrix S ∈ F (n+t−k)×(n+t−k) q m such that:
where Q is a matrix of size t × (n + t) whose entries lie in the small field F q and R is a homogeneous matrix of weight 2 and of size (n − k) × n. In this way there exists an invertible matrix P of size (n + t) × (n + t) with coefficients in the field F q such that
which concludes the proof.
The idea now to sign as a legitimate user will be to use the matrix R and the decoder of Fact 1 (see Section §3). Recall that to make a signature for the matrix H pub (which defines the public code C pub ) and a message m, we look for an error e of rank w satisfying n − k = d(w − t − t ′ ) (see Equation (3) of Fact 1), such that H pub e ⊺ = s ⊺ with s = H (m) (the hash of the message). The algorithm that follows performs this task:
1. We compute y ∈ F n+t q m such that H pub y ⊺ = s ⊺ .
2. Let y ′ = y(P −1 ) ⊺ and we compute s ′ = (SH ′ P)y ′ ⊺ .
3. Let s ′ 1 be the first t coordinates of s ′ , s ′ 2 its last n − k ones. We apply the decoder of §3 with:
-The parity-check matrix R and the syndrome s ′ 2 . Then we get a vector e ′ such that T ⊆ Supp(e ′ ) and Re ′ ⊺ = s ′ 2 ⊺ .
4. We compute e = (s ′ 1 , e ′ )P ⊺ .
Let us now show the correctness of this algorithm, in other words we show that H pub e ⊺ = s ⊺ with |e| = w satisfying n − k = 2(w − t − t ′ ).
Proof of Correctness. First we have:
which implies that H ′ (e − y) ⊺ = 0 and y−e ∈ F q m ⊗C ′ pub . Recall now that F q m ⊗C ′ pub ⊆ C pub and therefore H pub (e − y) ⊺ = 0. By linearity we get H pub e ⊺ = H pub y ⊺ = s ⊺ . Thus under the condition that the decoder in Point 3 works for the matrix H ′ , the syndrome s and the subspace T our algorithm decodes the syndrome s relatively to H pub . The parity-check matrix R is homogeneous of degree 2, has n − k rows and n columns. We can therefore apply to it the decoder of §3. It will output (we use here Fact 1) an error e ′ of weight w ′ that satisfies n − k = 2(w ′ − t − t ′ ). Note that this implies that w ′ = w which is the error weight we want to achieve. Then the error e = (s ′ 1 , e ′ )P ⊺ has the same rank as Supp(s ′ 1 ) ⊆ T ⊆ Supp(e ′ ) and P is an invertible matrix in the small field which concludes the proof.
To summarize, in essence with codewords of rank 2 in the public code of RankSign and under Assumptions 1 and 2 we find the decoder that was used to sign with the secret key.
Concluding remarks
This paper is only a preliminary version of our work which gives a quick report on our attack on RankSign. It will be followed by a more elaborated version which will analyze more precisely the complexity of this attack and which will show that it is actually polynomial for all possible strategies for choosing the parameters of RankSign. Repairing the RankSign seems to require to modify the scheme itself and not just adjust the parameters.
It might be tempting to conjecture that this approach could also be used to mount an attack on the NIST submissions based on LRPC codes such as [ABD + 17a, ABD + 17b]. Roughly speaking our approach consists in looking for low weight codewords in the LRPC code instead of looking for low weight codewords in the usual suspect, that is the dual of the LRPC code, that has in this case low weight codewords by definition of the LRPC code. This approach does not seem to carry over to the LRPC codes considered in these submissions. The point is that our approach was successful for RankSign because of the way the parameters of the LRPC code had to be chosen. In particular the length n, the dimension k and the weight of the LRPC code have to satisfy n = (n − k)d.
It is precisely this equality that is responsible for the weight 2 codewords in the LRPC code. If d is not too small (say > 3) and (n − k)d is not too close to n then all the approach considered here fails at the very beginning.
